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This paper focuses on the protection of vulnerable employees in South Africa, especially in 
regard to Temporary Employment Services (hereinafter referred to as “TES”).  
The protection of employees against unfair labour practices is crucial for job security.1 
According to Odeku, “decent work and decent conditions of employment are components of 
sustainable socio-economic development frameworks around the world.”2 However, according 
to Van Eck, “over the past two decades, business owners in South Africa have increasingly 
sought  to ‘externalise’ the traditional full-time, permanent, employer-employee relationship 
into a triangular labour broker connection”3 and “this [is done] when [TESs] make employees 
available to [clients] (third parties) and the client assigns duties to the employee and also 
supervises these services.”4 
The tripartite relationship involving the TES is regulated by s 198 of the Labour Relations Act5 
(hereinafter referred to as “LRA”). A TES is defined as a person who for reward, provides to a 
client, persons to render services to or to perform work for the client and obtains remuneration 
from the TES.6 This triangular relationship is established by an employment contract (which 
forms the basis of the employment relationship) and a commercial contract between the TES 
and the client.7 In terms of this relationship, the employee provides his or her services to a 
client, and such relationship is then regulated by a commercial contract between the client and 
the TES.8 Van Eck stipulates that in such a case, the TES entering into an employment contract 
with the employee administers the payroll and deducts taxes from the employee’s remuneration 
and “the commercial agreement usually incorporates a clause that such agreement will continue 
only for as long as the client needs the services of the employee”.9 Thus there is no contractual 
relationship between the client and the employee, even though the client supervises the services 
of the employee.10 The Labour Relations Amendment Act  6 of 2014 (hereinafter referred to as 
                                                 
1 KO Odeku ‘Labour broking in South Africa: Issues, Challenges and Prospects’ (2015) J Soc Sci, 43(1): 19-24 
20. 
2 Ibid.  
3 BPS Van Eck ‘Temporary Employment Services (Labour Brokers) in South Africa and Namibia’ (2010) 
PER/PELJ (13) 2 108. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the “LRA”). 
6 Section 198(1) of the LRA. 
7 E Gericke ‘Temporary Employment Services: Closing a loophole in Section 198 of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995’ 99. 
8 Ibid. 




the “LRAA”) came into effect on the 1 January 2015 and made changes to the law relating to 
the regulation of tripartite relationships. The amendments to s 198 will be discussed in this 
dissertation and in particular, there will be an analysis pertaining to whether these changes 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1.Introduction  
According to Theron, TES comprises of a scenario where a client provides work for the 
employee but is not accountable for the conditions in which the TES employees work in; this 
is referred to as non - standard employment.11 The workplace was considered the place where 
the employees worked and the employer was the person in actual control of the workplace until 
about the 1900s.12 Such employment was in line with the legal definition of “workplace.”13 
When explaining “non-standard employment”, Theron used the term “externalisation” to 
describe the form of employment where the conditions of work are regulated by an ordinary 
commercial contract and not an employment contract.14 Prior to the LRAA, South Africa’s 
system of labour regulations was built around a binary relationship (opposed to a triangular 
relationship).15 According to Van Der Burg,16 a standard employment relationship entails that 
the employment is full-time and the employee has one employer, that the employee works on 
the employer’s premises, that the employment is ongoing and that an employment contract is 
in place.  The addition of the TES in this triangular relationship does not equate to a standard 
relationship. 
Therefore, the use of TESs in South Africa led to those employees engaged by TESs being left 
without adequate protection. Further to this, the rights afforded to the standard employees were 
not available to the non-standard employees such as; the right not to be unfairly dismissed or 
not to be subjected to unfair labour practice;17 the onus of the employer to prove that the 
dismissal was fair once the dismissal is established by an employee;18 and the remedies (an 
order to the employer to re-instate the employee, to re-employ the employee or to pay 
compensation) available upon the establishment of an unfair dismissal or unfair labour practice. 
                                                 
11 J Theron ‘Prisoners of a paradigm: Labour broking, the ‘new services’ and non-standard employment.   
Reinventing Labour Law’ (2012) AJ 59. 
12 Ibid60. 
13 Section 213 of the 1995 Act defined “workplace” as the place where the employees of the employer work.  
14 Theron (note 11above) 65. 
15 Ibid67. 
16 A Van Der Burg ‘A case study of Labour Brokerage on Fruit Farms in Grabouw’ (2009)   www.wfp.org.za 
(Last accessed on the 22 December 2016). 
17 Section 185 of the 1995 LRA.  The meaning of “dismissal” and “unfair labour practices” is set out in s 186 of 
the LRA.  
18 Section 192 of the LRA.  
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The rights that are mentioned in this paragraph are crucial to job security as highlighted by 
Odeku.19  
The rise in casualization in South Africa is a result of employers attempts to avoid a standard 
employment relationship and the obligations incorporated into this relationship.20 As Van Der 
Burg21 stated, the law provided mainly for the standard employment relationship without taking 
into account TES employees.22 In most cases the TES employees were prejudiced as they did 
not have access to the right not to be unfairly dismissed or to be protected against unfair labour 
practices (as will be discussed in the dissertation).  In an attempt to avoid circumvention of the 
employees’ rights and in view of the constitutional right to choose one’s trade and profession, 
Parliament chose to regulate TESs rather than ban TESs from operating.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
This mini – thesis aims to explore and to analyse the Labour legislation dealing with TESs. 
The history and conception of TESs are highlighted and the development of the law relating to 
the protection of the TESs employees’ rights. This mini-thesis further aims to provide 
recommendations (extracted from various legal writings and court cases) which are able to 
develop the law and provide solutions to the gaps in the law.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The research questions in this dissertation are: a) whether the amendments to s 198 of the 
LRAA provide adequate protection to the employees engaged by TESs and; b) are there any 
ways in which the gaps in the current legislation can be rectified.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
This is a quantitative, book-based study. Primary and secondary sources from the library and 
the internet will be analysed. No original information will be collected. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Odeku (note 1 above) 20. 
20 Van Der Burg (note 16 above) 18. 
21 Van Der Burg (note 16 above) 21. 
22 Van Der Burg (note 16 above) 22. 
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1.5 Structure of Dissertation and Chapter Outline  
Chapter One gives an introduction into TES’s and the nature of the employment it entails.   
Chapter Two discusses the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the influence of 
International law in South Africa. This is highlighted in order to consider whether South 
African law is consistent with international standards relating to TESs.  Namibian law, which 
has close similarities to South African law, is also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Three sets out the history of TESs in South Africa and the laws that regulate them. It 
indicates the changes that occurred in the law over the past years which led to the enactment 
of the LRAA. The issues relating to TESs and the non-regulation thereof is also set out in depth. 
Chapter Four discusses the changes that are brought about by the LRAA and case law dealing 
with this Act. It also analyses whether the current labour legislation is adequate in addressing 
the issues set out in Chapter Three.   
Chapter Five sets out the conclusion which entails a summary of each chapter in this 
dissertation and provides an answer to the research questions. It further sets out 















THE ROLE OF THE ILO AND THE POSITION IN NAMIBIA REGARDING TESs 
2.1. The ILO 
2.1.1. Introduction  
The ILO was created in 1919 and is seated in Geneva.23 “The main aims of the ILO are to 
promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities and enhance social 
protection.”24 It attempts to achieve these aims “by bringing together governments, employers 
and [employees] to set labour practices [and develop] policies.”25 The ILO has three main parts, 
namely, “the International Labour Conference, the Governing body and the International 
Labour Office, which comprise governments’, employers’ and workers’ representatives.”26 
Despite the existence of the different functions of the respective bodies, each one has the 
ultimate aim of establishing international standards for decent work in the world.27 The 
International Labour Conference is the highest organ of the ILO and meets annually in Geneva. 
The ILO has created many conventions and policies regarding TESs in an attempt to ensure 
decent work.28 There were various conventions adapted over a period of time which eventually 
encouraged the regulation of TESs, as TESs played a role in reducing the unemployment rate 
in economies. In this chapter, the various ILO Conventions are discussed, which highlight the 
role of TESs in society and reflects upon the fact that regulation thereof is crucial.   The specific 
conventions are discussed in the paragraphs below. 
2.1.2. Unemployment Convention 1919 
This was the first instance in which TESs were recognized on the international plane and given 
approval at a certain level. However, the drafters of the convention never had the intention that 
                                                 
23  International Labour Organisation ‘Origins and History’   
     http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm (Last accessed on 20 December 2015). 
24 International Labour Organisation ‘How the ILO works’  
     http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo- works/lang--en/index.htm (Last accessed on 20   
December 2015). 
25 Ibid.   
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
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the brokers should make a profit, as the convention did not permit a fee.29 Each member which 
ratified the convention had to establish a system of free public employment agencies under the 
control of the central authority.30  
2.1.3. Fee Charging Employment Agencies Convention 1933  
This convention banned brokers who charged fees with the view of making a profit.31 The 
convention stated that the role of the TES is to place workers with clients and stipulated that 
brokers for profit had to be abolished within a three-year period.32 According to Muvanga,33 
the convention displayed a good regulatory system regarding nonprofit brokers. Benjamin34 
conceded that this convention was given little support by the members of the ILO.  “Fee-
charging employment agencies not conducted with a view to profit [were] required to have 
authorisation from the competent authority and was subject to the supervision of the said 
authority; [could]  not  charge [more than] the scale of charges fixed by the competent authority 
with strict regard to the expenses incurred; and [could] only place or recruit workers abroad if 
permitted  to do so by the competent authority and if their operations were conducted under an 
agreement between the countries concerned.”35 
2.1.4. Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention 1949 
This convention revised the 1933 Convention discussed in the preceding paragraph. If member 
states were going to abolish the fee charging TESs, then it had to be done within the regulatory 
mechanisms and within the prescribed three-year period. The TESs had to be regulated by a 
competent authority and could only charge fees within a scale that was agreed upon by the said 
authority.36 In terms of this convention, if the member state decided to abolish the fee charging 
agent, they had to set up a public employment agency first.37 The writer is inclined to come to 
the conclusion that this was an indication that TESs were a crucial part of the labour economy 
                                                 
29 RA Mavunga, University of Pretoria, 2010, Critical Analysis of Labour Brokers: Should they be regulated or 
banned in South Africa, LLM Dissertation, 8. 
30 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/  (Accessed on the 15 December 2015). 
31 Mavunga (note 29 above) 9; Article 1 of the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention 1949. 
32 Article 3 of the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention 1949.  
33 Mavunga (note 29 above)10. 
34 P Benjamin. ‘Untangling the Triangle: The Regulatory Challenges of Triangular Employment’ (2009) 
Preliminary Draft for Presentation to the “Regulating Decent Work Conference in Geneva” 11-12. 
35 (note 24 above). 
36 Mavunga (note 29 above) 11. 
37 Ibid; International Labour Organisation ‘Private Employment Agencies Temporary Agency Workers and their 
contribution to the Labour Market’ (2009) Issues Paper for discussion at the Workshop to Promote the 
ratification of the Private Employment Agencies Convention 1997 (No. 181) 4-6. 
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and that they were necessary to curb job losses at the time. Therefore, this convention regulated 
the obligatory step of setting up a public service agency, even if the member state decided to 
abolish the TES industry.  
2.1.5. Homework Convention 1996  
A “home worker” is defined as a person who provides a product or service in their home or 
other premises, excluding the premises of the employer. This is done irrespective of which 
party provides the equipment (either the home worker or the employer).38 The term “employer” 
means a person who either directly or through an intermediary, whether or not intermediaries 
are provided for in national legislation, gives out home work in pursuance of his or her business 
activity. 
This Convention39 “provides protection for home workers, giving them equal rights with regard 
to workplace health and safety, social security rights, access to training, remuneration, 
minimum age of employment, maternity protection, and other [labour] rights”. Article 4 sets 
out the various rights that are afforded to the home worker:  
“(a) the homeworkers’ right to establish or join organizations of their own choosing and to 
participate in the activities of such organizations;  
(b) protection against discrimination in employment and occupation;  
(c) protection in the field of occupational safety and health;  
(d) remuneration;  
(e) statutory social security protection;  
(f) access to training;  
(g) minimum age for admission to employment or work; and  
(h) maternity protection”.40   
                                                 
38 Article 1 of the Homework Convention 1996; Mavunga (note 29 above) 11. 
39 Preamble to the Homework Convention 1996. 
40 Ibid  
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The member state has control over the extent of implementation of these rights, by means of 
enacting national laws in terms of Article 5.41  The member state exercises the implementation 
of these rights and subsequently impacts the laws governing TESs. Thus even if the member 
state is not part of any of the Conventions, national law can regulate TESs. South Africa has 
adopted legislation which is in line with the Conventions.42 
2.1.6. The Private Employment Agencies Convention of 1997 
“One purpose of this Convention is to allow the operation of private employment agencies as 
well as the protection of the workers using their services, within the framework of its 
provisions.”43 Article 1 sets out that the meaning of “private employment agency” as follows: 
“Private employment agency [referred to] any natural or legal person [who provided] one or 
more of the following labour market services:  
(a) services for matching offers of and applications for employment, without the private 
employment agency becoming a party to the employment relationships which may arise 
therefrom; 
 (b) services consisting of employing workers with a view to making them available to a third 
party, [who] may be a natural or legal person (referred to below as a ‘user enterprise’) which 
assigns their [employment] and supervises the execution [thereof]”44.  
This article introduced the acceptance of the TES and allowed its operations, provided that the 
content of this Convention was promulgated into the member state’s national laws. This 
supported the ILO’s attempts to regulate rather than ban TESs. According to this convention, 
the TES’s employees should not be denied the right to freedom of association or collective 
bargaining.45 Article 5 of this convention sets out that “a Member shall ensure that private 
employment agencies treat workers without discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, 
religion, political opinion, national extraction, social origin, or any other form of discrimination 
covered by national law and practice, such as age or disability”.  
                                                 
41 The national policy on homework shall be implemented by means of laws and regulations, collective 
agreements, arbitration awards or in any other appropriate manner consistent with national practice. 
42 Such as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 11 of 2002. 
43 Article 2 of the Private Employment Agencies Convention of 1997.  
44 Ibid.  
45Ibid Article 4. 
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2.1.7. Do the ILO conventions apply to South Africa?  
In 1919, South Africa was one of the founding members of the ILO. However, due to the 
enactment of apartheid laws and because of political pressure from the members of the ILO, 
South Africa withdrew its membership in 1964.46 South Africa remained isolated for a period 
of thirty years until it was readmitted as a member on 26 May 1994.47 Today, the ILO has an 
office in Pretoria.48 “South Africa is a member of the Governing Body and also chairs the 
Africa Regional Committee of the Africa Group (ARLAC) and also participates in ILO Sub-
committees.”49 In order for any convention to be applicable to South Africa, the national law 
of South Africa would have to incorporate the content thereof. In South Africa, the highest law 
of the land is the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 199650 (hereinafter 
referred to as the “1996 Constitution”). The 1996 Constitution provides that when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights,51 a court, tribunal or forum must consider International law.52  South Africa 
is a member of the ILO and is therefore expected to give effect to the obligations set out in the 
ILO conventions.53 
 
2.1.8. Conclusion  
The ILO conventions discussed in this chapter would have an influence on South African law 
as s 39 of the Constitution places an onus on the courts to consider International law and further 
to this, South Africa is a member of the ILO. The conventions discussed earlier encourage the 
regulation of TESs, which led to their regulation and not the mere banning of them in South 
Africa.  As the conventions are drafted by the international community, it is important to 
consider them as they reflect the ways in which South Africa can regulate TESs.54 
 
                                                 
46 Department of International Relations and Cooperation  
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/ilo.htm (Last accessed on 01 December 2015). 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “1996 
Constitution”). 
51 Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution.  
52 Section 39 of the 1996 Constitution. 
53 Mavunga (note 29 above) 17. 
54 Ibid.  
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2.2. The Namibian Position 
2.2.1. Background  
Namibia is discussed as a case study as there are similarities between the law in Namibia and 
South Africa. According to Van Eck, both parties are members of the ILO but neither has 
adopted the Agencies Convention.55 Further to this, both countries have a Constitution which 
is their supreme law, which guarantees the right to freedom of occupation, trade and 
profession.56 Van Eck further states that both countries have had issues with the regulation of 
TESs. According to Van Eck, South African Courts are not bound by the judgments of foreign 
cases but they are obliged to consider Foreign law. Therefore, South Africa should look at the 
position of Namibia for guidance in this regard.57 
2.2.2 Case law 
According to Van Eck,58 “Arguments in favour of the regulation of TES were countered in the 
Namibian Parliament by the view that it would be similar to regulatory attempts made by the 
opponents to the abolitionists’ struggle against slavery. It was said that slavery could not be 
regulated in an attempt to give it a humane character.” The result of this debate was the 
implementation of s 128 of the Namibian Labour Act59 (hereinafter referred to as the “NLA”) 
which prohibited the operation of TESs in Namibia. In Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Government of Namibia 60(hereinafter known as the “Africa Personnel Case”) an application 
was brought by the Africa Personnel Company, which challenged the constitutionality of s 128 
of the NLA and sought an order striking down the provision.61 The Respondent contended that 
the applicant had no locus standi to take the matter to court as the rights vested in Article 
21(1)(j) vested in natural Namibian citizens.62 Article 21(1)(j) protects a person’s right to 
practise any profession, carry on any occupation, trade or business.63 This argument was based 
on the fact that Article 21(1)(j) was linked to human dignity and therefore only natural persons 
                                                 
55 Van Eck (note 3 above) 120. 
56 Ibid; Section 23 of the South African Constitution.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Van Eck (note 3 above) 112-113. 
59 Namibian Labour Act 11 of 2007. 
60 Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v Government of Namibia SA 51/2008 2009 NASC 17. 
61 Ibid para 1. 
62 Ibid para 9. 
63 A similar provision is found in s 22 of the Constitution 1996. 
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could exercise this right.64 The Supreme Court of Appeal stated that a generous and purposive 
approach should be followed and that “all persons” included both natural and juristic persons.65 
The Namibian High Court relied on Roman law regarding the letting and hiring of personnel 
services in return for money, to guide it.66 The Supreme Court of Appeal found in favour of 
the Personnel Services and stated that “had contracts of service remained marooned in Roman 
or common law of pre-modern times, the narrow scope of their application would have been 
entirely inappropriate to address the demands of employment relationships in the modern 
era.”67 The Respondent in this case also addressed the issues relating to TESs, including the 
difficulty of unionisation of TES employees.68 The unionisation of employees has its 
foundation in the standard employment contract as it is “based on four key assumptions [being] 
that the workplace is the place [that] workers work, [the] employer controls the workplace, that 
[the] employment is a binary relationship; and that [employment] is ongoing.”69 This would 
ensure that employees can be represented at the workplace, by unions.  
The Court further highlighted the issues raised by the Respondent relating to TESs such as the 
client escaping legal responsibilities and duties; the client not having a responsibility to pay the 
TES employees; the fact that the client could remove the workers without having to satisfy the 
procedural and substantive fair dismissal laws; that the client has no duty to resolve disputes 
between employees at the workplace; the client can avoid allowing a trade union to represent 
the employee; the client can just pay hours worked to the TES employees instead of paying a 
permanent employee; the TES escapes liability as they provide clauses which stipulate the “no 
work, no pay” principle and workers could be placed on or off duty at the whim of the TES.70  
The TES offers remuneration to the employees but can also terminate their employment, 
leaving employees without legal recourse. These reasons have been discussed in Chapter Three 
of this dissertation as they also apply to South African TES employees. The Respondents 
submitted that TESs facilitate casualization of work; clients retrench permanent workers so that 
TES employees can be used at cheaper rates; this results in an under-regulated environment 
                                                 
64 Van Eck (note 56 above) 23. 
65 (Note 60 above) para 36-37. 
66 Ibid para 23. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Van Eck (note 56 above) 107. 
69 Ibid 108. 
70 Ibid 112. 
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and the possibility of adversely affecting the employees bargaining power, skills and 
development training; and thus their request to ban TESs was justified in light of the above.71  
According to the Court, in reference to Hall,72 these issues have been addressed in many 
countries which opt for high regulation of TESs. Examples of addressing the issues are: 
regulating the length of agency contracts; placing restrictions on the purpose for which agency 
contracts should be allowed; guaranteeing equal treatment between TES employees and 
permanent employees, with specific reference to their terms of remuneration and their terms of 
employment.73 Further to this, the Court highlighted eight countries74 that have laws that 
guarantee equal pay between and conditions of employment for TES employees and permanent 
employees.75 The issues highlighted by the Respondents were the same issues raised in South 
Africa by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (hereinafter referred to as “COSATU”), 
which called for a total ban of TESs in South Africa.76 ANC Head of Economic 
Transformation, Enoch Godongwana, rejected Cosatu’s call to ban labour brokers.77 
The Court further stated that with proper regulation, structured in accordance with the 1996 
Constitution and Convention No 181, agency work would be temporary and would not 
adversely affect standard employment relationships or unionisation, and that it could contribute 
to flexibility in the market place.78 The Court struck down s 128, as the blanket prohibition 
infringed upon the right to exercise the freedom to carry on any trade or business, resulting in 
the provision being unconstitutional.79 The Court held that the 1997 Convention, which 
facilitates agency work and regulative measures in other democratic societies, could be used to 
effectively regulate agency work in Namibia without transgressing upon the rights in Article 
21.80  The Court stated that s 128 “substantially overshoots permissible restrictions” which may 
be placed on the exercise of the Article 21 right contained in the Namibian Constitution.81  The 
                                                 
71 Ibid 114. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
75 (Note 60 above) para 114.  
76 D Harrison ‘ANC head of economic transformation Enoch Godongwana insists Cosatu’s recent resolution is 
not economically viable and borders on unconstitutional’ http//mg.co.za/article/2015-11-26-anc-rejects-
cosatus-call-for-a-ban-on-labour-brokers (Last accessed on 18 June 2016). 
77 Ibid. 
78 Van Eck (note 56 above) 117. 
79 Article 21(1) (j) of the Namibian Constitution Act 1 of 1990. 
80 Van Eck (note 56 above) 117. 
81 Ibid 118. 
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Court held that the ban fell outside of reasonable restrictions and was disproportionately severe 
as opposed to what was necessary in a democratic society.  
 
2.2.3 Conclusion  
The SCA in the African Personnel Case took into account the ILO’s Agency Conventions, 
even though the ILO was not a signatory of the Convention.82 According to Van Eck,83 it was 
clearly the intention of the ILO to regulate TESs and not to ban them. He further stated that the 
aim of the ILO was to recognise TESs and to regulate them in order to ensure that employees 
engaged by TESs were not exploited.84 The writer is of the opinion that South Africa made the 
correct decision to regulate TESs. If Parliament chose to ban TESs, the outcome would have 
certainly been similar to that of the Namibian outcome, as s 22 of the South African 
Constitution would have been infringed. If Parliament had decided to ban TESs in South 














                                                 
82 (Note 60 above) para 36. 
83 Van Eck (note 3 above) 116. 




THE HISTORY OF TESs AND THE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE LAWS 
REGULATING TESs 
3.1. Background  
TESs have been used in South Africa since the 1950s, but have been unregulated by the Labour 
Relations Act85 (hereinafter referred to as the “1956 LRA”). The 1956 Act did not contain a 
definition for these types of services.86 TESs became more popular in the 1980s, and were 
granted legal recognition by means of a statutory definition contained in the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act87 (hereinafter referred to as the “1983 Amendment Act”) which legally 
recognised TESs.88 The definition in the 1983 Amendment Act has remained in s 198 of the 
more recent Labour Relations Act89 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1995 LRA”), apart from the 
replacement of the words “labour brokers” with “temporary employment services”.90 In s 
1(3)(a) of the 1983 Amendment Act, the TES was identified as the employer, with the 
employees engaged by the TES  regarded as its employees. Under s 1(3)(b) of the 1983 
Amendment Act, the TES and employees associated with it were considered to perform work 
in the industry or trade in which the employee’s activities ordinarily fell, irrespective of the 
trade or industry in which the client carried on his business.  
The 1995 LRA replaced the 1983 LRA and legitimised TESs to an extent as it left out the word 
“deemed” in s 198(2).91  The section states as follows: “For the purposes of this Act, a person 
whose services have been procured for or provided to a client by a temporary employment 
service is the employee of that temporary employment service, and the temporary employment 
service is that person’s employer.” In terms of the 1995 LRA, protection was only given to 
employees when a TES breached a collective agreement.92  
 
                                                 
85 Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
86 A Botes ‘Answers to the questions? A critical analysis of the Amendments to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
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88 Botes (note 86 above) 110. 
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clearly stipulated that the TES engaged employee is the employee of the TES.  
92 Section 198(4)(a) – (c) of the 1995 LRA. 
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In the 1956 LRA,93 there was no definition of TES and as such it was only incorporated into 
the 1983 Amendment Act. According to Botes,94 s 1(a) of the 1983 Amendment Act identified 
the TES as the employer of its employees, in terms of a tripartite relationship. Section 1(3)(b) 
regulated the trade of employers and directed disputes to be forwarded to the Labour Court. 
Section 1(3)(c) of the Amendment Act deemed the clients premises where employees worked 
to be the TES’s premises. In doing so, the employee had the chance to be a part of a trade union 
and to be represented by the trade union.  Unfortunately, when legislators drafted the 1995 
LRA, they did not incorporate s 1(3)(b) and (c). This omission meant that the TES employees 
were uncertain of who their employer was when a dispute arose and as such did not know 
which party they should institute proceedings against. In addition to this, the Labour Court had 
no jurisdiction to hear disputes regarding the TES employees.   
 
According to Botes,95 there were other sections in the Amendment Act which would have been 
very useful in our current LRA, such as s 1 (3)(d) which provides that any acts or omissions by 
a client are deemed to be actions of the TES. Despite triangular relationships being dealt with 
in the LRA, there were certain aspects not covered, which has led to the exploitation of 
employees. When the proposed amendments were drafted by the Minister of Labour, they 
highlighted that TESs would be banned and all temporary employment should be permanent 
unless the employer can provide a valid reason why the employment should be for a fixed 
term.96 However, due to the rising unemployment rate in South Africa, there is a need for TESs 
as they allow for flexibility in the economy and provide employment to unemployed people.97 
This is aligned with the discussion above regarding the position of the ILO and the conventions 
which favour regulation as opposed to the banning of the TESs.  
 
3.2. Problems associated with the Regulation of TESs 
Even though a definition of TESs was included in the 1995 LRA, there were issues relating to 
the regulation of the TESs, which resulted in inadequate legal protection for the employees 
engaged by TESs. 
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According to Benjamin,98“While the 1983 amendment clarified the identity of the employer of 
indirect employees, it gave rise to other problems. Employees became vulnerable to abuse by 
‘fly-by-night’ TESs. If a TES who had engaged workers for a client failed to pay them, the 
employees had no recourse against the client because the client was not their employer.” 
 
Section 198 of the LRA was intended to regulate the TES employees who were rendering work 
on a temporary basis, but the provisions were instead used to justify indefinite relationships 
between the client and the employee, leading to negative consequences for the employees.99 
The client, in certain instances, did not intend to use the TES employee as a temporary 
employee, but rather intended on retaining the employee for a period longer than three months 
without having to pay benefits or the same rate of remuneration as it had to pay to its permanent 
employees who were entitled to such benefits in terms of labour legislation. Further to this, s 
198 allows “employers to deprive employees of protection against unfair dismissals, to exclude 
them from collective bargaining and to apply less favourable terms and conditions of 
employment”.100 This is as a result of an employment contract which regulates the TES and 
employee relationship and which often incorporates provisions that are detrimental to the 
employee’s rights. Some of these instances will be discussed in this chapter.  
 
Section 198 of 1995 LRA made the client and the TES “jointly and severally liable for breaches 
of the BCEA, sectoral determinations, collective agreements and arbitration awards. If a TES 
fails to pay amounts owing to its employees, the client for whom the employees worked is 
liable to make those payments – regardless of whether the client has paid the TES or not.”101 
In theory, this joint and several liability transfers the risk of the TES defaulting on its 
obligations from the employer to the client. “However, the Labour Court has held that a client 
cannot be sued directly in the CCMA or Labour Court as it is not an employer.102 The employee 
can only proceed against the client if it has obtained a judgment or award against the TES, 
which the TES declines to pay. In practice, vulnerable workers are seldom able to exhaust these 
                                                 
98 P Benjamin ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment of Selected Provisions of the: Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 
2010 Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Bill, 2010 Employment Equity Amendment Bill, 2010, 
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procedures in order to hold the client accountable.”103 The CCMA and the Labour Court did 
not have jurisdiction to hear disputes between the client and the worker, arising from unfair 
dismissal and unfair labour practice.104  
Despite s 198 of the 1995 LRA and in light of the “atypical nature” and the complexity of the 
construction of the employment relationship relevant to TESs,105 there was a deficiency in the 
regulation of the TESs and s 198 simply did not cater for all the elements and possible obstacles 
that TES employees experience in the triangular employment relationship.106 The 1995 LRA 
provided “umbrella” provisions (general provisions) which recognised the TESs but omitted to 
include protection against unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices. As time passed, it 
became clear TESs needed to be statutorily recognised and regulation was required in order to 
prevent the exploitation and infringement of any of the parties’ rights, especially those of a 
vulnerable employee.107  
TES employees are disadvantaged in terms of the bargaining power they have to negotiate 
wages and other conditions of service, as the client remains the dominant party in the 
bargaining process between TES and the employees.108 According to Van Eck,109 if a TES is 
unable to provide an employee to a client within the client’s budget, the client will seek the 
services of another TES which is able to meet its budget requirements.110 This results in the 
client comparing the offers that are available by the various TESs and accepting the lowest 
offer.111 Therefore the TES employees do not receive the same wages and other conditions of 
service as the employees who are permanently appointed by the same client.112 
Another issue is that a client can easily instruct a TES to remove the employee with no 
obligation on the TES to find a new placement for such employee.113  The TES is the employer, 
which means that the employee can only challenge the TESs’ termination of their services, and 
not the decision by a client to terminate their assignment.114 “As employees are not guaranteed 
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work by a TES, they have no effective protection against unfair dismissal, even when they have 
worked for one client for a considerable period of time.”115 The client’s request to the TES to 
remove an employee from its premises or from an assignment, is covered in their commercial 
contract and therefore falls beyond the reach of labour law.116   
 
With the incorporation of the TES into the legislation117 as discussed above, TESs became 
increasingly popular.118 According to Gericke,119 this increase is not a result of the labour laws. 
It is suggested that the labour laws have, created an inflexible labour market by not properly 
regulating the TESs. The reasons clients’ use TESs include avoidance of employment risks and 
costs related to unfair dismissals120. Furthermore, during times of economic recession, TESs 
are most welcome in an economy as they enable flexible work for employees and clients. In 
some instances, employers use TESs because it cannot afford to pay the employees a permanent 
staff rate.121 Therefore, it seems that regulation instead of an outright ban was the better option.  
 
According to Gericke, s 23(1) of the 1996 Constitution guarantees a fundamental right which 
everyone has, ie the right to fair labour practices. This fundamental right that is afforded to 
every citizen, is also applicable to TES employees. Despite having the right to fair labour 
practices, employees sometimes choose to enter into employment contracts that are less 
favourable to them. They do this because when they are faced with choosing between earning 
an income in terms of a tripartite employment relationship, or being unemployed because 
employers are unwilling or unable to employ permanent staff, employees would generally 
choose to work despite unfavourable conditions.122 When a person is faced with the option to 
earn a lower salary to sustain himself and his/her family, the decision to earn less than a 
permanent employee is easier than not earning a salary.123 A breadwinner merely wants to 
ensure that his family has basic nutrition to survive, even if it means that they have to be 
exploited to achieve this result.124 
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In terms of South African law and the principle of sanctity of contracts,125 employers can easily 
get away with drafting contracts of employment which are beneficial to them. Therefore, it was 
crucial to strictly regulate tripartite employment relationships in order to prohibit exploitation 
(resulting from contracts that are beneficial to the employer) from taking place, and to confer 
liability for unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices on both clients and TESs.126 Section 
198(2) of the Act legitimises the contract which exists between the vulnerable employee and 
the TES. This section sets out the foundation of the relationship by stating that a person whose 
services are procured for the client, is the client of the TES, and the TES is the employer. This 
section was in essence the very reason that tripartite relationships were permitted in our 
country.   
Benjamin highlights two grounds which would violate the Constitution if TES were to be 
banned.127 Firstly, it would violate the fundamental right to choose a trade, occupation or 
profession freely128 and secondly, the scope of who qualifies as an employee under labour law 
would be drastically changed. For the purposes of this dissertation, the violation of the right to 
choose a trade, occupation or profession freely is discussed.  
TES workers have additional problems when it comes to exercising their organisational rights 
and engaging in collective bargaining, because they are required to engage with the TES as 
their employer and not the client themselves. According to Benjamin,129 a change in the law in 
this regard was necessary as trade unions found it difficult to recruit union membership and to 
retain their membership during periods when they were not earning an income due to non-
placement. According to Botes,130 the 1995 LRA provided that there were two contracts that 
would be created, that is the commercial contract between the client and the TES and the one 
between the TES and the employee. In terms of s 198, the TES was the employer’s employee. 
It was necessary to have one employer designated to the employee in order to alleviate any 
confusion.131 Nonetheless, despite the allocation of such rights to the employee, the atypical 
                                                 
125 When parties enter into a contract with each other, unless a party was forced to sign it, they will be bound to 
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126 P Benjamin ‘Labour Law beyond Employment’ (2012) ILJ 31.  
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nature of such employment relationship made it difficult for the employee to access such 
rights.132 The employee, when faced with a labour dispute, often went to the CCMA and 
instituted the dispute against the client, but the CCMA would throw the matter out based on 
the fact that it was instituted against the incorrect party.133 In terms of the Regulatory Impact 
Assessment,134 the TES employees received lower salaries compared to their permanent 
counterparts and were also subject to less favourable conditions.135 
Further to this, TES employees could not join trade unions as the TES employees’ work place 
would be the TES premises, and not the client’s premises, which created a problem in respect 
of representation. Section 12(1) of the 1995 LRA provides that trade unions can enter the 
workplace to recruit or communicate with workers. According to Budlender,136 this provision 
is meaningless in terms of a trade unions organisation and freedom of association, because the 
TES is not in control of the workplace. Further to this, issues arise when determining 
representativeness as workers are scattered throughout different companies operating in 
various sectors.137  
According to Botes, TESs tried to withhold labour rights from the TES employees by 
identifying them as independent contractors, which in effect excluded them from the protection 
of the LRA and other labour legislation,  and  exempted the employer from the responsibility 
attached to their role as employer.138 These types of cases are referred to as “disguised 
employment.”139 In the case of Mandla v LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd,140 the learned Judge Basson 
stated the real relationship should be gathered from the entire contract and in doing so, it would 
be quite easy to ascertain if the contract is a disguised contract.141 
Another issue pertaining to the 1995 LRA was the lack of security available to the TES 
employees, as the client was able to terminate the contract or place the employee on short notice 
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whenever they wanted to.142 In this instance the TES would include a resolutive clause in the 
contract whereby the contract would terminate automatically by operation of law should the 
client terminate the commercial contract.143 When a contract terminates by operation of law 
there are no legal remedies available to the employee, however, in this case, this is in actual 
fact an unfair dismissal thereby depriving the employees of their labour rights to not be unfairly 
dismissed.144 
According to Botes,145 another obstacle in this tripartite relationship concerns the status of the 
TES.146 It is the TES which was responsible for the infringement of any of the employee’s 
rights and unfair labour practices that are inflicted on the employee by the TES.147 As Botes 
states,148 it may be impractical to hold the TES responsible since the TES has very little control 
over the employee’s actual place of work or any working conditions. He further states that it is 
therefore unjustified to expect the TES to be responsible for such liability despite the legislation 
allowing such liability.149 Further to this, the provision150 which held that the TES and the client 
shall be jointly and severally liable in certain circumstances caused much confusion to the 
employee, who was uncertain as to whom to institute an action against.151 
3.3 Conclusion  
The various issues discussed above clearly reflected that Parliament had to make a decision 
regarding TESs and the future regulation thereof. As discussed in Chapter Three, an outright 
ban would not be the proper decision, especially taking into account that the courts in our 
country would have to take into consideration the ILO and the Namibian position. In so doing, 
the most appropriate course of action would be to regulate TESs. This chapter set out the issues 
associated with TESs and the challenges that TES employees experienced due to the inadequate 
regulation of their tripartite relationship.  
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CHANGES IN THE LAW – THE 2014 LRAA 
4.1. Introduction  
Chapter Four set out the challenges associated with the law regulating TESs. It further reflects 
that it is necessary to regulate TESs and that Parliament made the correct decision in regulating 
and not banning TESs. This chapter aims to discuss these changes and to look at the changes 
brought about by the 2014 LRAA.  
4.2 Background 
Section 21 of the 1995 LRA was amended by adding that if a dispute  relating to organizational 
rights arises, the commissioner should take the workforce into account, including the TES 
employees.152  In terms of s 21(12) of the LRAA, the trade union may seek to exercise its rights 
on the TESs or the client’s premises, taking into account where the employee is at that time.153 
Section 22 of the LRA states that any arbitration award made in respect of organizational rights 
shall be binding upon the TES as well as the client provided that the client is permitted to 
participate in the proceedings.154 This consequently deals with the issue regarding trade unions.  
Section 198(4) of the LRA was also expanded as follows:  
Subsection 4A deals with the joint and several liability of the client and permits the employee 
to institute action against the TES, the client, or both parties should they wish to do so.155 
According to Coetzee and Patel, “a more complex question is posed by s 198(4A)(c) [as] this 
section [envisages] that a TES employee could approach a client with an award or order [taken] 
with the TES’s name on it and enforce such order or award against the client, which marks a 
statutory departure from the common law position.”156 The common law position is set out in 
Ngema & Others v Screenex Wire Waring Manufacturers.157 The Labour Appeal Court 
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(hereinafter referred to as the “LAC”) explored the said substitution in the context of a s 197 
transfer and accordingly referred to Ex Parte Body Corporate of Caroline Court,158 which 
highlighted as follows: “It is a principle of our law that interested parties should be afforded an 
opportunity to be heard in matters in which they have a direct and substantial interest” and that 
“there is no express exclusion in the LRA that an interested party should not be afforded an 
opportunity to be heard in a matter where it has a direct and substantial interest.”159  
 
This equated to the common law position which prohibited a TES employee from enforcing an 
order or award against a client unless such client had been joined as a party to the 
proceedings.160 Section 198(4A)(c) now deviates from the  common law position that such an 
order or award may be enforced against a client of a TES  only where the TES is cited in the 
proceedings and on the order.161 Should an order or an award be given against a TES, the TES 
employee could in terms of this section, submit an affidavit to obtain a warrant of execution, 
requesting both the TES and the client be cited for such execution.162 One can envisage a 
number of factual disputes being raised regarding whether a TES employee may enforce an 
order or what the position is with an award which cites only the TES against the TES’s client.163  
 
Section 4A(b) allows a labour inspector to enforce the provisions of the BCEA against either 
the TES or the client both concurrently.164 Subsections 4B and 4C sets out that the TES is 
obliged to provide the employee with a written contract and that the employee cannot perform 
work under terms that are inconsistent with labour legislation.165 Subsection 4D deals with the 
bargaining council and the sector that the client is operating in, and subsection 4E stipulates 
that the Labour Court or an arbitrator may determine whether the provisions of the employment 
contract or the commercial contract adheres to subsection 4D in every case brought forward by 
the employee.166 These provisions now gives the employee an opportunity  to have their 
disputes heard and resolved. It further enables the Labour Court or the arbitrator to make any 
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order or reward in resolving the issues.167 Subsection 4F stipulates that TESs need to be 
registered in terms of the relevant LRA in order to be operative.168 These sections apply to 
atypical169 employees who earn below the threshold of R205 433.30 per annum which is 
determined by the Minister of Labour.170 
4.3 Do the provisions relating to TESs in the LRAA adequately regulate TESs? 
The deeming provision which is dealt with in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and 
Others171 makes the temporary employee a permanent employee of the client three months 
after placement.  According to section 198B, employment that is conducted in terms of a 
fixed term contract that exceeds three months will be deemed to be permanent employment 
subject to certain exceptions.172 The exceptions entail the employer successfully proving that 
the nature of the work for which the employee is employed is of a limited or definite 
duration; or there is another justifiable reason for the temporary appointment such as section 
those exceptions listed in s 198B(3).173 The exceptions listed in this section are as follows: If 
the employee is replacing another employee who is temporarily absent from work; is 
employed on account of a temporary increase in the volume of work which is not expected to 
endure beyond 12 months; is a student or recent graduate who is employed for the purpose of 
being trained or gaining work experience in order to enter a job or profession; is employed to 
work exclusively on a specific project that has a limited or defined duration; is a non-citizen 
who has been granted a work permit for a defined period; is employed to perform seasonal 
work; is employed for the purpose of an official public works scheme or similar public job 
creation scheme; is employed in a position which is funded by an external source for a 
limited period; or has reached the normal or agreed retirement age applicable in the 
employer’s business.174 This provision ensures that the employee is not exploited by the 
employer who attempts to use a fixed contract when the employee is not really temporary or 
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where the employer opts for a temporary employee in order to reduce the cost associated with 
permanent employment, such as non-payment of bonuses, medical aid etcetera.175 
The question that arises here is whether the TES’s relationship with the employee terminates 
and if not, whether the one that remains with the client is an employment one.176 In terms of 
the dispute before the Court, the placed workers remain the employees of Assign for all 
purposes and are deemed to be the employees of Krost (the client) for the purposes of the 
Act.177 According to the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (hereinafter referred 
to as “NUMSA”) though, the placed workers are deemed to be employees of only Krost, in 
terms of the LRA.178 According to Assign, its position is one of dual employment which 
according to the Court is misleading.179 Assign provided no arguments that the contractual 
rights and obligations vest equally with the client upon placement but contended that once a 
placement occurred, the client became entitled to  the LRA rights and obligations and further, 
that the two relationships operate in parallel and that the contracts of employment with the TES 
remain in force.180 According to the Court, neither position suggests that the client, upon  
placement, becomes a part of the TES contract or otherwise becomes vested with the 
contractual rights and obligations.181 The focus is  only on the statutory rights and obligations 
contained in the LRA governing the employer’s interaction with the employee.182 Assign 
submitted that the rights and obligations were conferred equally on the TES and the client but 
NUMSA contended that they were only inferred on the client.183  
Upon interpreting the provision of s 198 A (3) (a), the Court found that the provisions make 
the client the employer for the purposes of the Act only and that the client is not joined into 
contractual rights that exist between the TES and worker.184 The Court further agreed with the 
concession that this section only attributed employer status for the purpose of the LRA.185 The 
only issue before the Court was whether the TES continued to be the employer for the purposes 
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of the LRA and it was found that there was no reason why the TES’s statutory rights and 
obligations should be terminated.186 It was further stated by the Court that the worker became 
entitled to the statutory protections which resulted automatically from their engagement with 
the TES, and that the worker should not be expected to sacrifice the statutory protection because 
the TES has found placement with a client of the TES’s designation.187 According to the Court, 
neither party chose to rationalize the position of the TES, thus the remarks are made abstractly 
and in speculation.188  
The Court further stated that the operative amended clause189 stipulates beyond doubt that the 
TES and the client are equally responsible for the purposes of the LRA.190 The TES is therefore 
obliged to observe the provisions of the Act. This is reinforced by a clause making the client 
jointly and severally liable for breaches of the instruments and the provisions under the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (hereinafter referred to as the “BCEA”).191 Section 198A (3)(i) 
deemed the employee to be the employee of that client and the client is deemed to be the 
employer and in terms of ss (3)(ii) (subject to the provisions of s 198B), is deemed to be 
employed on an indefinite basis by the client.192 
According to the Court, much of the argument was aimed at the meaning of the word 
“deemed”.193 It was found that the deeming provision is only enforceable for the purposes of 
the LRA, therefore, the clause would not be enforceable against the client as an employer in 
the absence of this clause.194 The Court further stated195 that the scope of these protections will 
give rise to considerable litigation in the future and set out an example as follows: In the event 
of a contract being concluded between the TES and the employee and the client contract 
containing a clause obliging the employee to stop working for the client if the TES directs.196 
If the clause was incorporated merely to circumvent the clients duty to comply with the 
requirements of a fair dismissal, the transfer would constitute a dismissal in terms of Section 
                                                 
186 Ibid.  
187 Ibid.  
188 (note 171 above) para 8. 
189 Section 198 of the LRA. 
190 (note 171 above) para 9. 
191 Ibid.   
192 Ibid.  
193 (note 171 above) para 14. 
194 Ibid.  
195 Ibid para 16. 
196 Ibid.  
26 
 
198A (4).197 Would this then not lead to the client raising the point that it had no alternative 
but to submit to the “contractually – sanctioned” decision to terminate taken by the TES? This 
could be determined by ascertaining whether the client requested the TES to withdraw the 
worker from its workplace.198 The Court stated that if it is a unilateral decision by the TES to 
withdraw the employee in order to enhance its own interests then it is difficult to condemn a 
client.199 
A “deeper conundrum” is that a contract of employment is one in which the employee “subjects 
his or her productive capacity” to the employer.200 If the employer were to exploit this capacity 
and if their conflict needs to be avoided, the source of control must always be unitary.201   The 
Court states further that once a TES concludes a contract of employment, it becomes a source 
of control and continues to hold this power, and when the client sets the task for the employee 
it does so as an agent or representative and the TES is the one in control.202 Should the TES 
terminate the contract of employment with the employee, the relationship between the client 
and the employee must come to an end,203 unless a fresh contract is entered into between the 
client and the employee.204 If there is an unfair dismissal claim by the employee it will be 
directed against the TES alone. It is interesting to note that the Court questioned whether the 
drafters of the amendments realised their ambitions and further stated that this will be 
determined with time and litigation.205 The Court found, in this instance, that the commissioner 
had erred in finding that Krost was the sole employer.206 According to the Vice President of 
the Federation of African Professional Staffing Organisation (hereinafter referred to as 
“APSO”), such judgment has “brought optimism for stability to businesses, temporary workers 
and the TES industry, which have witnessed job losses and the folding of businesses during 
this time of uncertainty.”207  
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Regarding the same issue, in the case of Mphrime v Value Logistics Ltd and BDM Staffing 
(Pty) Ltd,208 the Court stated that section 198A(3)(b)(i) cannot be interpreted in isolation and 
therefore, the ruling would consist of an interpretation of s 198 and s 198A holistically.209 The 
Court stated that the legislator acknowledges the existence of a unique triangular relationship 
and that for the purposes of the LRA, the person whose services have been procured is the 
employee of the TES and the TES is that persons employer, thus resulting in the TES being the 
duty bearer in terms of the duties and obligations towards the employee.210  
In terms of s 198 (4) of the LRA, the TES and the client are jointly and severally liable if the 
TES contravenes: 
a. A collective agreement in a bargaining council regulating the terms and conditions 
of employment; 
b. A binding arbitration award regulating terms and conditions of employment; 
c. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA); 
d. A sectoral determination made in terms of the BCEA211. 
 
According to the Court, the legislator set very specific boundaries to the joint and several 
liability and these were related to s 198(4)(a) – (d).212 Section 198 (4A) to (4E) was introduced 
into the legislation by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014 and this section cannot 
be interpreted in isolation.213 Section 198 (4A) stipulates that if the client of a TES is jointly 
and severally liable in terms of s 198(4) of the LRA or is deemed to be the employer of an 
employee in terms of section 198 A(3)(b) – 
a. The employee may institute proceedings against either the [TES] or the client or 
both the [TES] and the client; 
                                                 
208 Mphrime v Value Logistics Ltd and BDM Staffing (Pty) Ltd (2015) FSRFBC34922 NBCRFLI  
     [24 June 2015]. 
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b. A [TES] acting in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act may secure 
and enforce compliance against the [TES] or the client as if it were the employer, 
or both 
c. And any order or award made against a [TES] or client in terms of this subsection 
may be enforced against either. 
According to the Courts interpretation, the section deals with the liability of the client in 
two situations:214 
 The liability of the client in terms of s 198(4) amounts to joint and several liability 
and there are no immediate issues as s 198(4A)(a) – (c) deals with the recourse of 
the joint and several liability in terms of contravention by the TES of the BCEA, 
sectoral determinations, collective agreements and awards regulating terms and 
conditions of employment;215 and  
 The liability in terms s 198A (3) (b) where the client is deemed to be the employer 
of the employee for the purposes of the LRA. In this instance there is confusion as 
the Court states that one wants to automatically assume that the employee can 
institute a claim jointly and severally for his dismissal but the joint and several 
liability in s 198(4) is not extended to a claim for unfair dismissal under the LRA. 
 
The Court, in determining the section, looked at the Memorandum of Objects as contained in 
the Labour Relations Bill 2012, which states that s 198 continues to apply to all employees and 
retains the general provisions that a TES and its clients are jointly and severally liable for 
specified contravention of employment laws.216 The Court stated that this was a clear indication 
that joint and several liability is limited to the specified grounds in s 198(4) only.217 The 
memorandum further stipulates that, “An employee instituting an action against either the TES 
or the client or both may enforce any award made against either of them.”218  According to the 
Court, the Memorandum makes no provision for the enforcement of all types of awards against  
the TES or the client, but it is limited to claims for joint and several liability.  It went on to state 
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that when one considers the entire s 4 holistically, it deals with the BCEA.219 The joint and 
several liability in not indicative of  dual employment and the Court draws attention to s 197 
(8) – (9)220 wherein the old employer and the new employer are held jointly and severally liable 
where the old employer is clearly not the employer anymore.221 In terms of s 198A, it introduces 
additional protection for vulnerable employees and applies only to employees who earn below 
the threshold prescribed in terms of s 6(3) of the BCEA.222 In highlighting the abuse and the 
additional protection required for TESs, the Court referred to four cases:223 
 SATAWU obo Dube and 2 Others v Fidelity Supercare Cleaning Services Group 
(Pty) Ltd224 which dealt with the issue of the automatic termination by a client of a 
contract with the TES. The Court held that s 198 (4C) permits the Labour Court or 
the Arbitrator to determine any claim made by an employee in order to ascertain 
whether the employment contract or the commercial contract complies with 
subsection 4C, and to make an appropriate order or award.225 According to the Court 
in this case, automatic termination clauses in contracts which undermine the right 
to fair labour practices are prohibited, and TESs can no longer use this contract as 
a shield to circumvent legislative protections afforded to the employee.226 
 
 Kelly Industrial Ltd v CCMA and Others227 dealt with an employment contract that 
stipulated that upon the termination of the assignment by the TES, the agency 
agreement comes into operation and the TES will try to find alternative assignments 
for the employee however,  during that time , the employee will not receive 
remuneration or benefits and should not expect that another assignment will be 
given to them.228 It was found that the so called “agency agreement” puts the 
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employee at the mercy of the TES, makes the employee vulnerable, infringes the 
right to security of employment and contradicts the definition of employment.229 
 Nape v INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd230 where the employees’ employment 
contract with the TES was cancelled due to the client no longer requiring his 
services. The employer argued that the contract allowed for this situation and this 
amounted to an automatic termination.231 The Court disagreed with the TES and 
struck down the provision of the contract as it clashed with the provisions of s 198 
of the LRA.232 It further held that a contractual provision that permitted a TES to 
withdraw an employee from the client’s placement was against public policy and in 
breach of the employees’ constitutional rights entitling him or her fair labour 
practices.233 The Court further added that it is not bound by contractual limitations 
created by parties who exercise great bargaining power over vulnerable employees 
and held that any contractual clause in the employment contract that permits the 
client to undermine the employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed is against 
public policy.234 
 NUMSA and others v Abancedisi Labour Services235  where the employees were 
asked by the client to leave the premises as they refused to sign documents at the 
worksite and were “suspended” by the TES. The TES submitted to the Court that 
the employees were not dismissed but merely suspended indefinitely.236 The 
employees were not provided with an alternative assignment and neither were they 
paid after being removed from the client’s premises. In this instance, the Court 
found that prohibiting the employees from working, which they were employed to 
do, may constitute a “wrongful repudiation and a fundamental breach” of the 
contract which entitles the employee to terminate the contract.237 
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Section 198 A (1) interpreted “temporary work” as work by an employee for a period less 
than three months, when the temporary employment services employee substituted an 
employee of the client who is temporarily absent.238 The Court referred once again to the 
Memorandum of Objectives which stipulates that employees in terms of this section are 
employees of the TES for the purposes of the LRA only if they are employed to carry out 
genuine temporary work.239 The Court further referred to s 198A (3) (a) which sets out, for 
the purposes of this Act, an employee who performs a temporary service in terms of the 
work set out in ss (1) is the employee of the TES.240 The Court241 went on to state that as 
long as the employee is performing genuine temporary work, joint and several liability will 
be applicable in terms of any contravention  of s 198A(4)242 by the TES.  An interesting 
stipulation in the Memorandum reads as follows: “If the employees are not employed to 
perform genuine temporary work, then they are deemed for the purposes of the Act to be 
employees of the client and not the TES.”243 The Memorandum of Objectives244 in terms 
of the LRA includes rights such as freedom of association, organisational rights, collective 
bargaining, strikes and lock-outs, workplace forums, trade unions and employment 
organisations, dispute resolution, unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices.245  
The Court then referred to s 198A(3)(b) which provides that an employee who is not 
performing a temporary service for the client is deemed to be the employee of that employer 
on an indefinite basis.246 Giving the word “deemed” its ordinary grammatical meaning, it 
means that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary an employer –employee 
relationship between the employer (the client) and the employee exists in terms of the LRA 
which means that there is no transfer of the employee.247 The wording of the Act is not 
clear as there is no implication that the employee is being transferred to the client and 
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neither is there an indication that the triangular relationship is automatically dissolved once 
the employee is deemed to be an employee of the client.248 
The question that the Court highlights in interpreting the section, is that of who is 
responsible for the duties and the obligations in terms of the LRA. The Court found that  
based on the wording in the LRA, it is clear and unambiguous in that once the employee is 
not performing temporary services, the client is deemed to be the employer and therefore  
the party responsible for the fulfilment of the duties and obligations.249 The Court further 
stated that if the legislator had intended for the TES and the client to be jointly and severally 
liable, such liability would have been expressly stipulated in the Act.250 Furthermore, it 
stated that if the amendments were to be interpreted to mean joint and several liability in 
terms of the LRA only, the abusive practices would not be addressed and  awarding the 
client with duties and obligations as  employer, ensures that their constitutional rights and 
those of the employee are protected and enforced.251 
The Court then applied this interpretation to the case law examples252 used previously in 
this judgment and in this dissertation. In the Satawu Case253 if the client carried the duties 
and obligations as employer in terms of the LRA, it would have to follow the procedures 
laid down in s 189  of the LRA and the client would have to ensure that the dismissal for 
operational requirements was fair and  would have led to the employees’ rights being 
protected.254 In the Kelly case,255 if the client carried the duties and obligations in terms of 
the LRA, it would have to ensure that in the event that the employee was no longer needed 
due to operational reasons. that they carried out the proper process in terminating the 
contract.256 In doing so, this would have afforded protection to the employee from abusive 
practices and provided the client with the security that goes along with permanent 
employment.257  
                                                 
248 (note 208 above) para 33. 
249 (note 208 above para 34. 
250 (note 208 above) para 35. 
251 (note 208 above) para 37-38. 
252 (note 208 above); para 39. 
253 Ibid.   
254 (note 208 above) para 39.1. 
255 Ibid.  
256 (note 208 above) para 39.2. 
257 Ibid.  
33 
 
In the Nape Case,258 if the client had carried the responsibilities as employer in terms of 
the LRA, the client should have retrenched the employee at the time  the employees services 
were no longer required and even though this would not have prevented the retrenchment, 
it would have safeguarded the employee from being removed at the whim of the client.259 
Once again, the Court highlighted that it is against public policy and in breach of the 
employees constitutional right to fair labour practices.  Furthermore, if the client was 
deemed to be the employer it would prevent the employees from being treated as 
commodities that can be traded as clients see fit.260 
In the NUMSA case,261 had the client been deemed the employer, the client would have had 
the duty to ensure that the employee was charged with the appropriate form of misconduct, 
consequently dismissed and excluded from the premises. Had the employees been 
suspended, the client would have had to ensure that the employees were fully paid during 
the suspension period.262 In doing so, the employees’ constitutional and statutory rights 
would have been protected.263 The Court’s conclusion of the interpretation of s 198(3) (b) 
(i), is that the duties and obligations are placed on the client in terms of the LRA when an 
employee is not performing temporary services and if there are any claims by an employee 
in terms of the LRA, it must be taken against the client.264 
The Court further stated that there is nothing in the wording of the LRA amendments which 
indicate or infer a s 197 transfer occurs and neither does it indicate that the triangular 
relationship dissolves and that the commercial contract terminates.265 In the absence of the 
wording which would suggest either of these instances, one cannot assume such 
consequences.266 Further to this the legislator did not create joint and several liability or 
dual employment for the purposes of the LRA.267 In determining what happens to the 
commercial contract after the shift in liability to the client, the contract will have to be 
renegotiated between the parties and incorporated into the business agreement.  If such 
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agreement is in conflict with the employees’ rights it will not be binding and will be rejected 
by the courts.268 In conclusion, the Court highlighted that the TES will be liable for the 
duties and obligations for the purposes of the LRA when the employee is not performing 
temporary services.269 The Court subsequently held that the employee was employed by 
the TES on a fixed term contract, that the employee earned below the threshold,  was 
employed for more than three months and did not substitute an employee who was 
temporarily absent from work due to ill health or other issues, neither was he employed in 
a category determined as temporary service in terms of a collective agreement.270 
Therefore, the deeming provision in terms of s 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA was triggered, 
which resulted in the client being the employer in terms of the LRA and the TES had no 
right or obligation to participate in the legal proceedings.271 The client bears the onus to 
prove that the termination of the employees contract was fair and satisfied s 188 of the 
LRA.272 In terms of this judgment, the Court placed all the duties and the obligations on 
the client (not the TES) in terms of the LRA when the employee was not performing 
temporary services, which would then ensure that the client would follow the proper 
procedures in terms of the LRA for  dismissals and operational terminations which has been 
the heart of most of the cases dealing with these triangular relationships.   
4.4. Conclusion  
This chapter highlights that there are many issues that arise in terms of the LRAA which falls 
short of adequately regulating TESs. The various judgments discussed indicate that there will 
be court battles between the client, TES and the employees engaged by TESs in the future, in 
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5.1 Introduction  
According to Mavunga273, the difficulty in obtaining employment in South Africa and the 
stigma attached to being unemployed leads to the deterioration of the quality of family life and 
as a result, there is a greater need for TESs in our country. The use of TESs creates job 
opportunities for people entering the labour market and who have little or no experience. It 
further assists those people who prefer not to be employed on a permanent basis in order to 
assist them to study or take care of their children.274 Mavunga further states that275 it is difficult 
for employers to find workers who are willing to take on temporary work when the labour 
market tightens and at the same time it is difficult for employers to pay employees, especially 
skilled ones.276 It is important to note that in many instances TESs offer workers a better 
selection of employment even if it is just temporary, as employees are spread across a pool of 
companies to render services to them.277 Further to this, the efficiency of TESs together with 
the fact that they take on the administration of the recruitment and facilitation of employment, 
is an attractive option to clients as the client is not responsible for these duties. In some 
instances, this takes the burden off of the client as they specifically require the assistance of an 
employee for a short period of time in order to complete an assignment.278 
 
According to Mavunga, clients should be allowed to choose whether they want to use 
temporary workers279.  There is however, a positive duty on the government to regulate such 
relationships by creating proper legislation.280 The TESs’ employees have skills ranging from 
low to high  and the TES is able to assign such employees according to the specific needs of 
the clients.281 Such assignments can even facilitate the allocation of specific employees to a 
client for short periods of time, which is beneficial to the client and enables the client to 
concentrate on more pressing issues relating to the core business.282   
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5.2. Chapter Review  
 
Chapter One sets out the background and introduction to the tripartite employment relationship 
in South Africa. Chapter Two discussed the ILO and the conventions that regulate TESs and 
more specifically whether the provisions of the ILO conventions apply to South Africa. It 
further discusses the Namibian position and the Africa Personnel case in detail, investigating 
the similarities in the law between South Africa and Namibia. Both countries are members of 
the ILO but were not signatories to the Agency Convention and both countries have a similar 
Constitution which provides individuals with the right to choose a profession, trade or 
occupation. It was concluded at the end of Chapter Two that it was highly probable that South 
African Courts would have followed the judgment in the Africa Personnel Case had there been 
an outright ban placed on TESs in South Africa. One of the factors leading to this conclusion 
is the fact that South Africa must adhere to s 39 of the 1996 Constitution which places an onus 
on courts to consider foreign law.  
 
Chapter Three set out the history of TESs in South Africa and commenced with a discussion 
of TESs, setting out the various applicable Labour Relations Acts, beginning with the 1956 
LRA and ending with the 2014 LRAA. The changes to TESs were discussed in detail in respect 
of each of the LRAs and the problems associated thereto which eventually led to the enactment 
of the LRAA. Chapter Four set out the changes to s 198 of the LRAA regulating TESs and 
analysed South African case law to determine whether TESs are adequately regulated by the 
LRAA. The chapter also set out the challenges applicable to the interpretation of the LRAA 
and concluded that the LRAA does not adequately provide protection to the employees engaged 
by TESs, the TES or the client.  
 
5.3. Answer to the Research Question  
 
The research question set out in Chapter One is whether the amendments to s 198 of the LRAA 
provides adequate protection to the employees engaged by TESs.  
In answering the question, the writer treads carefully and respectfully states that the regulations 
do not adequately take into consideration the discussion in Mphrime v Value Logistics Ltd and 
BDM Staffing (Pty) Ltd and Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others, as discussed in 
Chapter Four. The Courts stated that there will be many disputes in the future due to the 
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interpretation of the LRAA.  According to the Court, “the wording of the Act is not clear as 
there is no implication that the employee is being transferred to the client and neither is there 
an indication that the triangular relationship is automatically dissolved once the employee is 
deemed to be an employee of the client.”283 Further to this the Court highlighted that  “the 
scope of these protections will give rise to considerable litigation in the future.”284 In this regard 
the writer also refers to Theron285 who stipulates that as long as the employees workplace is 
the clients workplace and not the TESs, the challenge that remains is in making the TES 
accountable for matters that are out of its hands. This study supports the regulation of the TES 
and applauds the South African government for taking steps to regulate TESs. However, to 
ensure fewer disputes in terms of these tripartite relationships and to afford the TES employees 
with job security, the LRAA regulating TESs should be amended in order to address some of 
the challenges and gaps raised in this document, as opposed to merely providing theoretical 
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